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Abstract 
Drawing on upper echelons theory, this study aims to provide evidence on the effects of the background 
influences of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chair of Audit Committee (CAC) on corporate risk 
disclosure. In practice, such corporate disclosures are found to be inadequate, and there is limited evidence on 
factors influencing risk disclosure decisions by management. Sampling from the 200 top listed companies in 
Malaysia, data is hand-collected from annual reports. Sentences in which pre-determined risk-related keywords 
appear are counted to measure total risk disclosure and its sub-categories. Demographic data for CEOs and 
CACs is collected, including age, functional track, education, tenure and ethnicity. The findings in this paper 
indicate that the CEOs’ tenure and ethnicity significantly influence their decision making in regards to corporate 
risk disclosure. That is, CEOs with Bumiputera ethnicity and with shorter-tenured backgrounds are associated 
with higher corporate risk disclosure. However, the background of CACs is found to have no significant 
influence. These results have implications for board decisions on the recruitment of CEOs. Further, there are 
implications for corporate governance policy-makers concerning the credentials of CACs in Malaysia. This 
paper provides empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate risk disclosure and the influence of pre-
dispositions of CEOs and CACs in Malaysian top listed companies since prior research has not investigated 
these two types of key management players in the area of corporate risk disclosure.  
Keywords: Malaysia, Corporate risk disclosure, Upper echelons theory, Chief Executive Officer, Chair of Audit 
Committee, Demographic characteristics 
 
1. Introduction 
The recent increasing awareness on the issue of corporate risk reporting creates immense pressure for 
corporations to conduct business in a more publicly responsible way. More broadly, the dynamic nature of the 
business environment nowadays has increased public demand for greater disclosure by firms relating to risks and 
uncertainties (Linsley and Shrives, 2005). The extent to which companies provide transparency about the 
management of their various types of risk is a central issue in good corporate governance. In essence, companies 
need to maintain a sound system of internal control and risk management procedures in which the disclosure of 
risk information should be prioritised and emphasized. Research into the factors that drive risk disclosure 
decisions by managers can provide a way forward to help better explain and understand how to enhance the 
corporate practice of risk reporting. It can also motivate management to increase the extent of voluntary 
disclosure of corporate risk information.  
Risk reporting would demonstrate that the board of directors understand, consider and manage risk well (Dobler, 
2008). It is important to inform shareholders the effect of risk on company’s future financial position. As the 
public demand for firms to make risk disclosure of corporate information has been increased, a number of well-
structured approaches to risk management have been developed over the recent years. These approaches are to 
facilitate the control and communication of different type of risks (Linsley and Shrives, 2000). Deumes (2008, 
p.122) addressed this potential corporate risk disclosure stating that, ‘studying risk disclosure is important 
because corporate transparency about risk is vital for the well-functioning of capital markets.’ 
The depth of research on corporate risk disclosure is substantially limited to its relationship with the company-
specific characteristics. These relationships have been studied by, for example, Linsley and Shrives (2006), 
Hassan (2009) and Amran et al. (2009). However, few researchers have concentrated on the internal managerial 
factors that influence the decision-making of risk disclosure. In our research, corporate risk disclosure is 
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considered from the perspective of a company’s disclosure decision-making processes. It addresses the research 
question of whether bounded cognitions or pre-dispositions arising from background experiences and 
qualifications of the key management players have an influence on the level of corporate risk disclosure in the 
Malaysian context.  
A theoretical perspective that was developed to address influences of top managements in corporations is that of 
the upper echelons theory. This theory has been built from the premises of earlier strategic choice literature (e.g., 
Child, 1972; Montanari, 1978). It was first introduced in the strategic management literature by Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) in the context of the effects of top managers’ bounded cognitions and values in their organization’s 
strategic decisions. According to Hambrick and Mason (1984) upper echelons theory is attributed to top 
managers’ bounded rationality (March and Simon, 1993; 1958) in which their choices are bounded and 
influenced by their idiosyncratic experiences and values. The central premise of upper echelons theory in which 
mainly built on the literature is that executive’s experiences, values and personalities as well as cognitive 
processes to a great extent influence their interpretations of the situations they face and, sequentially affect their 
judgment and decision making.  
The cognitive process of an individual is a psychological concept that is not directly quantifiable with sufficient 
objectivity across a range of situations. Hence, the argument of upper echelons theory is that demographic 
factors (age, ethnicity), experience (tenure, functional track) and educational qualifications will provide proxy 
data for the cognitive processes, and hence pre-dispositions, of executives. That is, demographics, experiential 
and educational factors are expected to shape the pre-dispositions and biases that executives bring to decision 
situations (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
Upper echelons theory establishes the link between top managements’ personal attributes and the firm’s strategy 
decisions and outcomes. This theory plays a role in corporate disclosure because top executives have power to 
greatly influence the decision-making of organizations (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Since these top managers 
have superior access as well as control over large corporate information, much of the company decision and 
strategic intent to disclose information rest on their discretion (Hambrick, 2007). Therefore, the idea that 
managerial characteristics could have an impact on corporate decisions on disclosure could be apparent. In 
relation to discretionary decisions about the public disclosure of a broad range of possible information on the 
past, present and future risks of the corporation and their management, the two key decision-makers are likely to 
be the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chair of Audit Committee (CAC). Note that the role of the audit 
committee of the board typically embraces the oversight of corporate reporting to shareholders and risk 
management. 
Despite the existence of prior evidence about demography of top managers and corporate decision choices, there 
is no evidence about whether different characteristics of top managers might affect corporate risk disclosure. The 
disclosure of risk information depends largely on managers’ willingness to actively disclose the sufficient 
information. Therefore, upper echelons theory is invoked to address the factors of the top management 
background that would influence their willingness to disclose risk information. The study has two objectives. 
The first objective is to establish a theoretical case, arising from upper echelons theory, for the relationship 
between specific demographic characteristics of the key executive (the CEO) and key director (the Chair of 
Audit Committee) and the level of corporate risk disclosure. The second objective is to empirically determine the 
effect of top managers’ demographic characteristics on corporate risk disclosure which helps to enrich the 
determinants of influential factors on risk disclosure by companies.  
2. Development of Hypotheses 
Reviewing extant research based on upper echelons theory; five manager-specific characteristics are chosen to 
demonstrate the relationship with the corporate risk disclosure in Malaysian corporations. These include age, 
functional background, education, tenure and ethnicity of top managers’ as recommended by upper echelons 
theory. Specifically, top managers refer to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief of Audit Committees 
(CACs). 
2.1 Age 
Upper echelons theory suggests that managers’ age can affect their values, cognitive styles and thus their 
decisions (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Psychology and finance research has found that risk aversion (e.g., 
investment in risky assets) appears to increase with age (e.g., Palsson, 1996). In other words, older managers are 
expected to be less aggressive in their accounting choices relative to younger managers. There are three likely 
explanations based on Hambrick and Mason (1984). First, older managers are already established and obtain 
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their place in society and this advantage will therefore make them continue to choose a strategy that helps them 
maintain this position. Younger managers on the other hand, it is contended, prefer risky strategies that will 
induce more benefits in terms of making their mark with the public. Second, older managers have greater 
psychological commitment to the organizational status quo (Child, 1974). Third, older managers ‘may be at a 
point in their lives at which financial security and career security are important’ (Hambrick and Mason, 1984, p. 
198). On any given decision-making, any potential actions that might have a risk to put their positions in danger 
are generally avoided. An empirical study by Palsson (1996) finds that age is associated with greater risk 
aversion in portfolio holdings. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) reported that older managers choose lower levels of 
corporate expenditures, lower leverage and larger cash holdings, consistent with conservatism. Since risk 
disclosure is a costly undertaking, these arguments suggest that older CEOs and CACs may develop more 
conservative and risk averse disclosure for fear such disclosures may prove inaccuracy.  
Therefore, the study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H1: There is an inverse relationship between the age of (a) the CEO and (b) the CAC, respectively, and the levels 
of corporate risk disclosure. 
2.2 Functional Track  
Hambrick and Mason’s (1984, p. 200) upper echelons theory suggests managers’ primary functional track affects 
their choices because ‘career experiences partially shape the lenses through which they view current strategic 
opportunities and problems.’ In other words, managers adopt strategies that fit their personal and hands-on 
experience. Hambrick and Mason (1984) classified functional track into ‘output functions’ and ‘throughput 
functions’. Output functions are functions such as marketing, sales and research and development (R&D). 
Throughput functions are functions such as production, process engineering and accounting. In this study, the 
categorisations of each function are broader with the inclusion of other related items. Specifically, it is found that 
the CEO’s and the CAC’s functional background are beyond what has been categorised as output functions and 
throughput functions above. Therefore, to reflect this study and particularly the Malaysian corporate 
environment, this study will add several more categories to be classified as output functions and throughput 
functions. There are three matched-categories developed for the purpose of functional track of top managers in 
this study. There are Entrepreneurial versus Bureaucratic, Public/Client engagement versus Internal organization 
role and Industry-specific expertise versus Widely-based expertise. Because output functions always relates to 
risky effort, output functions of managers are associated with the managers’ propensity for risk taking. It is 
argued that additional output functions of managers (entrepreneurial, public/client engagement and industry-
specific expertise) developed in this study is likely associated with the increasing of risk disclosure.  
As the output function is often associated with risk and uncertainty, it may be concluded that output managers 
are more aggressive risk-takers than throughput managers. Gupta (1984) argues that entrepreneur with output 
functions are likely better to deal with an uncontrolled environment and uncertainty than those with other types 
of functions. In relation to this study, these output types of managers are expected to disclose more risk 
information. Managers with a throughput background and work function may adopt a conservative disclosure 
stance as they are considered less tolerant of ambiguity (Holland, 1997). In a similar vein, Bamber et al. (2010) 
who studied voluntary earnings-related disclosure found that disclosure styles of managers promote from 
accounting and finance disciplines are associated with fewer but more precise disclosures. This is deemed to 
reflect the element of conservatism. Since corporate risk disclosure is a complex task which has an impact on the 
entire organization, throughput function-experienced CEOs and CACs are not expected to disclose more risk 
information.  
Therefore, the study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H2: There is an inverse relationship between the background of (a) the CEO and (b) the CAC, respectively in 
throughput functions and the levels of corporate risk disclosure. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Sample 
The sampling frame for this study is the 200 top listed companies, based on market capitalization, listed on the 
Main Board of Bursa Malaysia for the year 2009. Elimination is made of licensed institutions (such as 
commercial banks and finance companies) as well as those companies with unavailable or incomplete data due 
to a missing 2009 annual report or whole components of manager-specific or financial data. The final sample is 
128 companies. Consistent with previous corporate disclosure literature, this study chooses large companies 
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because they are more likely to disclose risk information (e.g., Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Abraham and Cox, 
2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). These prior studies have found a positive 
association between risk disclosure level and firm size. All the data has been hand-collected from the contents 
within the sampled annual reports. 
3.2. Measurement 
3.2.1. Independent variables 
Age (AGE) is measured by the actual ages of CEO and CAC, expressed in years.  
Functional track (FUNCTR) is measured by distinguishing between a throughput function (accounting, finance, 
production, process engineering) and output function (sales, marketing, research and development) in the 
experiential background of the CEO and CAC of the firm (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Other items are added 
to Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) list for this study because of the background ‘tracks’ disclosed in the sampled 
annual reports. The throughput function includes bureaucratic and internal organizational roles, while output 
functions include entrepreneurial, public/client engagement and industry-specific expertise roles. The variable is 
dichotomised into a value of one if the CEO or CAC is from a throughput function, otherwise it is given zero. 
The variable is also recoded with a value of one if the CEO or CAC is from output functions; otherwise it takes a 
value of zero.  
Education (EDU) is measured by the education level of the CEO and CAC of the firm holding professional 
accounting qualifications (CPA) and/or Master of Business Administration (MBA). In this study, the variable 
takes a value of one if the CEO or CAC holds CPA and/or MBA; otherwise it takes a value of zero.  
Tenure (TEN) is measured by the number of years the firm’s current CEO and CAC, respectively, have held the 
position.  
Ethnicity (ETHN) is measured by Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera CEO and CAC. The variable takes a value of 
one if the CEO or CAC is Malay (Bumiputera), otherwise it takes a value of zero. 
3.2.2. Dependent variable  
The measurement of extent of risk disclosure involves collection of data through content analysis which has been 
a widely used approach in accounting disclosure literature (e.g., Milne and Adler, 1999; Beretta and Bozolan, 
2004; Lajili and Zegal, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Deumes, 2008). 
Various units of analysis have been used by content analysts including words  (e.g.,  Deegan  and  Gordon, 1996); 
sentences (Milne  and Adler,  1999; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley  and Shrives,  2006; Abraham and Cox, 
2007) and  proportions  of  a page (Guthrie  and Parker,  1990). Milne and Adler (1999) and Linsley and Shrives 
(2006), choose sentences because they argue that these are more reliable than any other unit of analysis. They 
further argue that, a single word has no meaning to provide a basis for coding disclosures. Rather, an individual 
word should be looked at within a sentence to provide a proper context in order to achieve more valid measures. 
Therefore, the amount of disclosure chosen in this study to analyse the content of risk disclosure in annual 
reports is sentence count. This is in line with previous related risk disclosure studies (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). Moreover, this approach is chosen based on its 
objective measure and perceived high degree of accuracy in the underlying quantification of the risk items 
provided in annual reports. Since this study does not intend to determine the quality of risk disclosure, using 
sentences as the coding scheme is expected to provide more complete, valid and meaningful data for further 
analysis (Milne and Adler, 1999; Linsley and Shrives, 2006).  
In addition, to minimizing subjective judgement and inconsistency in quantifying risk disclosure from text, 
specific keywords are pre-defined. These keywords are drawn from a range of prior definitions of the risk. 
Annual reports are viewed through a portable document format (PDF) and details of keywords which are listed 
in Table 1 are searched. Further, all pictures and images such as charts, diagrams and their captions are excluded 
from the analysis to minimise the amount of subjectivity involved (Frost and Wilmshurst, 2000). 
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Table 1. List of Keywords 
 
Basic Keyword: Risk 
Other Risk Keywords 
Firm’s Expected Future Impacts Firm’s Current Vulnerability To Impact 
Outlook 
Prospect 
Opportunity 
Uncertainty 
Hazard 
Danger 
Harm 
Threat 
Exposure 
Loss 
Uncertainty 
 
Sentences in which the keywords appear are counted for the entire annual reports and sentences that contain risk 
items are reviewed and classified according to the types of risks. These types of risks were drawn from previous 
literature in the area, dividing risk disclosures into the following four categories: 1) operational risk, 2) 
environmental risk, 3) financial risk and 4) strategic risk.  These four categories are chosen from a combination 
of prior risk classification schemes by Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Cabedo and Tirado (2004), Lajili and Zegal 
(2005), Abraham and Cox (2007) and Deumes (2008). 
Table 2 gives definitions of each risk type.   
 
Table 2. Type of Risks and Its Definition 
 
Type of Risks Definition 
Operational risk The risk of the probability of losses arising from the essential operations side of 
the firm. It should covers issues such as internal control and information 
systems, risk management policies, project failure, product failure, operational 
problems, operational disruptions and health and safety. 
Environmental risk The risk that relates to external factors which are beyond the organization’s 
control and comprises risks such as political risk, social risk, legal and 
regulation risk, climate and catastrophic risk and industry sources of risks such 
as competition, suppliers and customers. 
Financial risk The risk that refers to financial management objectives and policies, interest 
rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk, price and commodity risk, credit 
risk, market risk and cash flow and liquidity risk.  
Strategic risk The risk that relates to events that are external to the company, but have a 
significant impact on its strategic decisions or activities. It is often the risk that 
organizations may have to take in order to expand and for the long-term 
continuity and sustainability of the organization which affect the overall 
direction of business. 
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
As with prior studies, this study includes company size, leverage, auditor size and industry classification as 
control variables in the regression model given the evidence of the association between these variables and 
corporate disclosure. Based on prior studies, these variables are shown to have an impact on corporate risk 
disclosure (Aljifri, 2008; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Oliveira et al., 2006; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005; Raffournier, 1995). 
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The summary of all the operational variables in this study is shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Summary of the Operationalization of the Research Variables 
 
Variables Acronym Operationalization 
Dependent variable:   
Corporate risk disclosure CRD Total corporate risk disclosure sentences in the 
year 2009  
   
Independent variables:   
Age AGE Overall number of age (in years) 
Functional track FUNCTR Dichotomous of 1 if managers rise from 
throughput function and 0 in output function  
Education EDU Dichotomous of 1 if managers posses CPA 
and/or MBA, 0 otherwise 
Tenure TEN Number of years the firm’s current managers 
have held the position or the number of years 
the firm’s current managers in the positions 
since their first appointment. 
Ethnicity ETHN Dichotomous of 1 if the company has a Malay 
(Bumiputera) manager; 0 otherwise  
Control variables:   
Firm size LNSIZE Natural log of total assets 
Leverage LEV The ratio of long-term debt to equity 
Auditor type BIG4 Dichotomous of 1 for firm that audited by Big 4, 
0 otherwise 
Industry classification: 
1. Trading / Services 
2. Construction 
3. Consumer product 
4. Industrial product 
5. Plantation 
6. Properties 
7. Infrastructure and 
Technology 
DUMMY 
INDUSTRY 
Dichotomous of 1 if the firm is in trading and 
services sector, 0 otherwise; 2 if the firm is in 
the construction sector, 0 otherwise; 3 if the firm 
is in consumer product sector, 0 otherwise; 4 if 
the firm is in the industrial product sector, 0 
otherwise; 5 if the firm is in plantation sector, 0 
otherwise; 6 if the firm is in the properties 
sector, 0 otherwise; 7 if the firm is in 
infrastructure and technology sector, 0 
otherwise. 
 
4. Results and discussion  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 and Table 5 present the descriptive statistics of the continuous and dichotomous variables, respectively, 
used in the regression tests of risk disclosure and top managers’ demographic characteristics. As reported in 
Table 4, the mean value of corporate risk disclosure is 90.68 sentences (the average number of risk disclosure 
sentences disclosed by the 128 sampled companies in 2009) which is approximately 37% of the maximum score 
of 244 sentences. The table shows that there is a fair amount of variation in the disclosure frequency for the 
sampled companies. The overall disclosure frequency ranges from 41 to 244 sentences. The mean score for each 
category of risk disclosure reveals that financial risk disclosure is highest (40.18 sentences), closely followed by 
operational risk disclosure (38.67 sentences). The risk categories of environmental risk disclosure (5.84 
sentences) and strategic risk disclosure (5.99 sentences) are much lower. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables 
 
  N
  
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
                             (Sentence count for disclosure items) 
Corporate Risk Disclosure 
(CRD)  128 41 244 90.68 36.623 
Operational Risk Disclosure 
(OPER_RD) 128 9 144 38.67 23.386 
Environmental Risk Disclosure 
(ENVIRO_RD) 128 0 24 5.84 3.956 
Financial Risk Disclosure  
(FIN_RD) 128 14 86 40.18 11.962 
Strategic Risk Disclosure 
(STRAT_RD) 128 0 25 5.99 4.713 
Age CEO (years) (AGE_CEO) 128 38 75 53.76 7.347 
Age CAC (years) (AGE_CAC) 128 40 88 63.42 9.515 
Tenure CEO (years) 
(TEN_CEO) 128 0 40 11.34 10.157 
Tenure CAC (years) 
(TEN_CAC 128 0 37 8.54 7.211 
Size (RM mil) (LNSIZE) 128 234.1 71363.0 5695.0 10286.7 
Leverage (ratio) (LEV) 
(LEV) 128 0.000 3.880 0.367 0.584 
Turning to predictor variables, Table 4 shows that the age of CEOs ranges from 38 years to 75 years with the 
average age of 54 years. The age of CACs on the other hand ranges from 40 years to 88 years with the average 
age of 63 years. With respect to functional track characteristics, Table 5 shows the majority of CEOs and CACs 
are in the ‘throughput’ category. This is shown by the average value of 64.8 percent and 85.2 percent, 
respectively. With regards to tenure characteristics, the length ranges from zero to 40 years for the CEOs and 
zero to 37 years for the CACs with the average of 11.34 years and 8.54 years, respectively. This result shows that 
the CEOs tenure in Malaysian companies is longer than the CACs tenure, suggesting that some of the CEOs are 
also likely to be the founder or pioneer of the companies.The mean size, as represented by total assets of the firm, 
is RM 5,700mil. The average for firm leverage is 36.66 percent. 
As reported in Table 5 for the education characteristics, the majority of CEOs (73.4 percent) do not have any 
professional accounting qualifications or MBA qualifications. On the other hand, more than half of the CACs 
(56.3 percent) hold professional accounting qualifications or MBA qualifications. With respect to the ethnicity of 
managers, Bumiputera (Malay) CEOs represent an average of 34 percent of the sample companies, indicating 
non-Bumiputera1 CEOs domination in the Malaysian corporations. However, the average of CACs who are 
Bumiputera is slightly higher (50.8%) than the non-Bumiputera CACs (49.2%).  
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Dichotomous Variables 
 
N 128 
Dichotomous Variable     1                   0 
   Refer to Table 3 for explanation 
Functional Track CEO      64.8% 35.2% 
(FUNCTR_CEO) 83 45 
Functional Track CAC 85.2% 14.8% 
                                                          
1In this study, Bumiputera refers to the Malay group and non-Bumiputera refers to the non-Malays which include Malaysian 
Chinese, Malaysian Indians and other ethnicity backg
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(FUNCTR_CAC) 109 19 
Education of CEO 26.6% 73.4% 
(EDU_CEO) 34 94 
Education of CAC  56.3% 43.7% 
(EDU_CAC) 72 56 
Ethnicity CEO 34.4% 65.6% 
(ETHN_CEO) 44 84 
Ethnicity CAC 50.8% 49.2% 
(ETHN_CAC) 65 63 
Auditor Size 74.2% 25.8% 
(BIG4) 95 33 
Trading / Services sector 32.8% 67.2% 
(TRADSERV) 42 86 
Consumer sector 20.3% 79.7% 
(CONSUMER) 26 102 
Industrial sector 26.6% 73.4% 
(INDUSTRIAL) 34 94 
Construction sector 7.0% 93.0% 
(CONSTRUCTION) 9 119 
Plantation sector 4.7% 95.3% 
(PLANTATION) 6 122 
Property sector 5.5% 94.5% 
(PROPERTY) 7 121 
Infrastructure and Technology sectors 3.1% 96.9% 
(INFRATECH) 4 124 
 
In terms of auditor size, 74.2 percent of companies are audited by a Big 4 audit firm. Finally, with respect to the 
industry classification, 32.8 percent of companies fall under the trading/services sector. This is followed by the 
industrial product sector and consumer product sector which comprise of 27 percent and 20 percent, respectively. 
The rest of the industry classifications form a minority proportion which comprise of construction, plantation, 
property and infrastructure and technology industries with the average values of 7.0 percent, 4.7 percent, 5.5 
percent and 3.1 percent, respectively. 
4.2. Correlation analysis 
To examine the correlation between the independent variables and each category of dependent variable, a 
Pearson product-moment correlation (r) is computed. This correlation analysis has been performed to test the 
correlation between the dependent variable (risk disclosure sentences) and independent variables. Table 6 reports 
the correlation results.  
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Table 6. Correlation Coefficients between Risk Disclosure and Independent Variables 
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AGE_CEO -0.188* -0.176* -0.125 -0.104 -0.061 
AGE_CAC 0.044 0.060 -0.077 0.023 0.013 
FUNCT_CEO 0.095 0.120 -0.035 0.000 0.093 
FUNCT_CAC 0.047 0.052 0.069 -0.064 0.173 
EDU_CEO 0.116 0.178* -0.087 -0.030 0.069 
EDU_CAC 0.105 0.099 0.226** -0.056 0.216* 
TEN_CEO -0.181* -0.181* -0.135 -0.049 -0.119 
TEN_CAC -0.002 -0.017 -0.170 0.135 -0.125 
ETHN_CEO 0.490** 0.521** 0.222* 0.108 0.348** 
ETHN_CAC -0.022 -0.053 0.003 -0.007 0.128 
LNSIZE 0.456** 0.414** 0.255** 0.237** 0.287** 
LEV 0.179* 0.245** 0.032 0.003 -0.012 
BIG4 0.199* 0.227** 0.039 0.019 0.170 
TRADSERV 0.156 0.211* -0.030 -0.050 0.185* 
CONSUMER -0.165 -0.146 -0.013 -0.102 -0.144 
INDUSTRIAL -0.111 -0.105 -0.065 0.001 -0.191* 
CONSTRUCTION 0.076 0.018 -0.035 0.111 0.183* 
PLANTATION 0.039 0.003 -0.010 0.087 0.040 
PROPERTY 0.014 -0.084 0.193* 0.112 0.066 
INFRATECH 0.064 0.116 0.087 -0.048 -0.086 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
As illustrated in Table 6, ethnicity of CEO (ETHN_CEO) and company size (LNSIZE) are significantly related 
to corporate risk disclosure (p < 0.01). Age of CEO (AGE_CEO), tenure of CEO (TEN_CEO), leverage (LEV) 
and auditor size (BIG4) are also significantly related to corporate risk disclosure (p < 0.05). Other independent 
variables and control variables are not correlated with corporate risk disclosure. The correlation coefficients 
between age of CEO and tenure of CEO with the corporate risk disclosure are negative. These results indicate 
that risk disclosure decreases with the increase of the age of CEO and CEO tenure. With respect to the 
operational risk disclosure, this is significantly positively correlated to ethnicity of CEO (ETHN_CEO), 
company size (LNSIZE), leverage (LEV) and auditor size (BIG4). Similar to the corporate risk disclosure, both 
age of CEO (AGE_CEO) and tenure of CEO (TEN_CEO) are significantly negatively correlated with 
operational risk disclosure (p < 0.05). Another upper echelons characteristic that is correlated with operational 
risk disclosure is education of CEO (EDU_CEO) which is significantly positively correlated (p < 0.05). This 
indicates that CEOs who are younger, have been in the position of CEO for a shorter period and hold either a 
professional accounting or MBA qualification tend to disclose more operational risk.  
With regards to financial risk disclosure, it is significantly positively related to company size (LNSIZE). In 
relation with upper echelons characteristics, no variable is found to have correlation with financial risk 
disclosure. This indicates that demographic characteristics of top managers are likely to have no influence 
towards financial risk disclosure, perhaps because the mandatory nature of financial risk disclosure in a 
dominant determinant.  
Environmental and strategic risks reveal similar significant relationships with upper echelons characteristics. The 
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variables are significantly positively related to ethnicity of CEO (ETHN_CEO) and company size (LNSIZE). 
However, only strategic risk disclosure is significantly positively related to education of the CAC (EDU_CAC). 
This indicates that CACs with higher education tend to seek narrower disclosure of more non-technical risk 
information.  
With respect to industry classifications, the results are varied in terms of discretionary disclosures. The 
trading/services sector is found to disclose more information on operational risk and strategic risk. Companies 
within the construction sector also tend to disclose more information on strategic risk. However, companies 
within the industrial sector are found to disclose less information on strategic risk. Companies within the 
property sector on the other hand tend to disclose more environmental risk. 
4.3. Multiple regression analysis 
This section provides results and discussion on multiple regression analysis for testing all ten hypotheses 
regarding the relationship between the CEO and CAC demographic characteristics and corporate risk disclosure. 
4.3.1. Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and corporate risk disclosure  
Several directional, but non-significant, relationships are seen in Table 7. From Table 7, the relationship between 
age of CEO (AGE_CEO) and corporate risk disclosure is negative and supports the contention that older 
managers are more conservative and tend not to disclose more information on risk. Since older CEOs are already 
established and have developed their place in the business community, they therefore continue to choose a 
strategy that helps them maintain their status quo by disclosing less risk information. However, the coefficient is 
not statistically significant; hence, hypotheses H1a is rejected. Second, this study finds a negative association 
between functional track of CEO (FUNCT_CEO) and corporate risk disclosure. This result suggests that a CEO 
with experience in ‘throughput functions’ will disclose less information on risk. However, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant, therefore, this finding does not support hypothesis H2a. Third, it is found that the 
education of CEO (EDU_CEO) in terms of those holding a professional accounting qualification or an MBA 
qualification is positively related to corporate risk disclosures. This result shows that executives with higher 
qualifications tend to disclose more risk information. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant thus 
allowing this study to reject hypotheses H3a.  
There are some significant relationships in Table 7. First, the relationship between the tenure of a CEO 
(TEN_CEO) and corporate risk disclosure, is found to be significantly negative (p < 10%). This finding suggests 
that longer-tenured CEOs are not willing to take risk and tend to be less confidence in disclosing risk 
information which is full of uncertainty. This result also indicates that the increase in the number of years a CEO 
has served in the firm is expected to have a stronger negative influence on the disclosure of risk information, 
which results in a lower total risk disclosure. Therefore, hypothesis H4a can be accepted. Second, the relationship 
between ethnicity of CEO (ETHN_CEO) and corporate risk disclosure is significantly positive, suggesting that 
greater risk disclosure is associated with Bumiputera (mainly Malay) CEOs. Hence, hypothesis H5a is accepted. 
This result suggests that CEOs from an ethnic background typically associated with lower socio-economic status, 
collectivist culture and Islamic faith that views transparency as virtuous, tend to direct their company to pursue 
strategies of transparency, including more risk disclosure, compared to non-Bumiputeras (composed of Chinese, 
Indians and foreigners). When the regression models were run for the sub-categories of risk disclosure (i.e., 
operational risk disclosure, environmental risk disclosure, financial risk disclosure and strategic risk disclosure) 
there were similar conclusions to the results presented here for total risk disclosure. That is, age and ethnicity of 
the CEO are the most consistently significant determinants of the various sub-categories of risk disclosure. 
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Table 7. Multiple Regression Results 
 
CRDjt= β0 + β1AGE_CEOjt + β2AGE_CACjt + β3FUNCT_CEOjt + β4FUNCT_CACjt + β5EDU_CEOjt + 
β6EDU_CACjt + β7TEN_CEOjt + β8TEN_CACjt + β9ETHN_CEOjt + β10ETHN_CACjt + β11LNSIZEjt+ β12LEVjt + 
β13BIG4jt + β14DUMMY (INDUSTRY) + εjt 
 CORPORATE RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 Coefficients t-stat 
(Constant) -125.333 -2.067** 
AGE_CEO -0.048 -0.557 
AGE_CAC -0.019 -0.187 
FUNCT_CEO -0.138 -1.588 
FUNCT_CAC -0.014 -0.159 
EDU_CEO 0.028 0.312 
EDU_CAC 0.103 1.039 
TEN_CEO -0.162 -1.739* 
TEN_CAC 0.094 0.971 
ETHN_CEO 0.379 4.296*** 
ETHN_CAC 0.027 0.331 
LNSIZE 0.402 4.239*** 
LEV -0.073 -0.732 
BIG4 0.055 0.658 
TRADSERV 0.169 0.408 
CONSUMER 0.159 0.446 
INDUSTRIAL 0.168 0.435 
CONSTRUCTION 0.173 0.731 
PLANTATION 0.146 0.725 
PROPERTY 0.137 0.647 
INFRATECH 0.100 0.623 
Adjusted R2 0.307 
F-Value 3.809*** 
N 128 128 
Notes: ***Significant at 0.01 level; **Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.1 level 
CRD = measured by risk disclosure score for year 2009, AGE_CEO = Age of CEO, AGE_CAC = Age of CAC, 
FUNCT_CEO = Functional track of CEO, FUNCT_CAC = Functional track of CAC, EDU_CEO = Education of 
CEO, EDU_CAC = Education of CAC, TEN_CEO = tenure of CEO, TEN_CAC = Tenure of CAC, ETHN_CEO 
= Ethnicity of CEO, ETHN_CAC = Ethnicity of CAC, LNSIZE = Size, LEV = Leverage, BIG4 = Auditor type, 
DUMMY (INDUSTRY) = Industry classification 
4.3.2. Chairman of Audit Committee (CAC) and corporate risk disclosure 
Table 7 reveals that all the CAC background characteristics have the predicted sign except for the variable tenure. 
The relationship between the tenure of CAC (TEN_CAC) and corporate risk disclosure is positive suggesting 
that the longer a CAC has held that position, the more corporate risk disclosure will be supplied. However, none 
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of the variables have a significant relationship with corporate risk disclosure. Therefore, hypotheses H1b, H2b, H3b, 
H4b and H5b are rejected. These results infer that the CAC’s pre-disposition based on his or her background might 
be suppressed by the formal regulatory compliance pressures of the CAC’a role.  
4.4 Endogeneity test between risk disclosure and ethnicity of CEO 
Research that models and tests the relationship between corporate outcomes (such as the level of financial 
performance or extent of corporate disclosure) and various governance mechanisms or management 
characteristics can be subject to the problem of endogeneity. Broadly, a loop of causality between the 
independent and dependent variables of a model leads to endogeneity. The problem of endogeneity occurs when 
the independent variable is correlated with the error term in a regression model. This implies that the regression 
coefficient in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is biased. 
The results presented earlier on the OLS regressions reveal that there is a significant positive relationship 
between corporate risk disclosure and the ethnicity of CEO. CEO ethnicity is found to be the most significant 
hypothesised explanatory variable in Table 7. This result indicates that firms with a Bumiputera CEO will 
disclose higher risk information. However, intuitively, there could be loop causality between a CEOs ethnicity 
and a firm’s risk disclosure. It was hypothesised in H05 that Bumipitera CEOs, due to ethnic-religious values they 
hold, would influence their firm towards higher disclosure of risk information. However, reverse causality could 
be argued. Thus, boards of firms wishing to change the level of risk disclosure might be prepared to change the 
CEO when the opportunity to make a change arises. Over time, boards wishing to reduce the level of risk 
disclosure might choose a non-Bumiputera CEO, whereas those wishing to increase the level of risk disclosure 
might choose a Bumiputera CEO. Because of this reverse causal relationship, the ethnicity of CEO will be 
endogeneous. 
The problem of endogeneity, between ethnicity of CEO and corporate risk disclosure can be statistically tested. 
This problem is statistically referred to as simultaneity because it has to do with two variables simultaneously 
causing each other. To solve this problem, instrumental-variable estimation is used. In particular, an instrument 
(or a set of instruments) that is assumed to be exogeneous is selected and then two-stage simultaneous least 
squares (2SLS) regression is performed. In this case, the endogeneous independent variable is ethnicity of CEO 
(ETHN_CEO). The instrumental variable (deemed to be exogeneous to risk disclosure level) could be the firm’s 
earnings per share (EPS). The reverse causality model between ETHN_CEO and RD that contains the 
instrumental variable EPS, is shown in equation 5.1. Equation 1 is regressed simultaneously with the ‘initial 
model’ developed for this study and repeated in equation 2.  
ETHN_CEOjt = β0 + β1RDjt + β5EPSjt + εjt ..............................................................................(1)  
 
 RDjt= β0 + β1AGE_CEOjt + β2AGE_CACjt + β3FUNCT_CEOjt + β4FUNCT_CACjt + β5EDU_CEOjt + 
β6EDU_CACjt + β7TEN_CEOjt + β8TEN_CACjt + β9ETHN_CEOjt + β10ETHN_CACjt + β10LNSIZEjt + β11LEVjt + 
β12BIG4jt + β13DUMMY (INDUSTRY) + 
εjt ..................................................................................................................................................(2) 
 
Equations 1 and 2 above were run simultaneously using the 2SLS estimator. The results are presented in Table 8.  
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Table 8. Simultaneous Equation Models Using 2SLS Estimator 
 
Panel A 
Simultaneous equation model estimated with 2SLS (Dependent variable: Ethnicity of CEO) 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>[z] [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
RD 0.005 0.001 5.79 0.000 0.003 0.007 
EPS -0.001 0.001 -1.00 0.319 -0.002 0.000 
CONSTANT -0.152 0.104 -1.45 0.146 -0.357 0.053 
Panel B 
Simultaneous equation model estimated with 2SLS (Dependent variable: Risk disclosure) 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>[z] [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
AGE_CEO -0.251 0.616 -0.41 0.683 -1.459 0.956 
AGE_CAC 0.308 0.558 0.55 0.580 -0.785 1.403 
FUNCT_CEO 9.073 13.225 0.69 0.493 -16.847 34.994 
FUNCT_CAC 6.333 12.269 0.52 0.606 -17.713 30.380 
EDU_CEO -43.085 32.076 -0.134 0.179 -105.953 19.782 
EDU_CAC 4.142 9.701 0.43 0.669 -14.872 23.157 
TEN_CEO -0.205 0.452 -0.45 0.650 -1.092 0.681 
TEN_CAC -0.008 0.679 -0.01 0.990 -1.341 1.323 
ETHN_CEO 136.688 27.269 5.01 0.000 83.240 190.135 
ETHN_CAC 1.227 7.601 0.16 0.872 -13.671 16.125 
SIZE 1.408 3.910 0.36 0.719 -6.254 9.072 
LEV 3.701 8.957 0.41 0.679 -13.854 21.258 
BIG4 7.587 9.890 0.77 0.443 -11.796 26.971 
TRADSERV -3.989 42.158 -0.09 0.925 -86.617 78.639 
CONSUMER 6.581 41.966 0.16 0.875 -75.671 88.834 
INDUSTRIAL -0.020 41.673 -0.00 1.000 -81.698 81.656 
CONSTRUCTION 0.760 44.392 0.02 0.986 -86.247 87.768 
PLANTATION 34.440 48.117 0.72 0.474 -59.868 128.748 
PROPERTY 4.483 44.246 0.10 0.919 -82.237 91.205 
INFRATECH -11.533 53.125 -0.22 0.828 -115.657 92.590 
CONSTANT -6.285 93.555 -0.07 0.946 -189.650 177.080 
The result of the Hausman test for both equations is Chi2 (df = 24) = 66 (p = 0.000). This significant Chi2 for the 
simultaneous equation confirms that there is endogeneity problem existing between risk disclosure and ethnicity 
of CEO. Therefore, the OLS results shown previously in Table 7 would have been biased. These results need to 
be replaced with the findings given in Table 8 below. By running the 2SLS estimator, Table 8, Panel B, deals 
with the endogeneity problem and still shows ETHN_CEO to be significantly related to RD (P>[z] = 0.000). It 
also confirms the reverse relationship in Table 8, Panel A, that RD is significantly positively related to 
ETHN_CEO. 
5. Conclusion and Summary 
By invoking upper echelons theory, this study has examined the relationship between the demographic 
characteristics of the key executive (CEO) and the key director (CAC) and the extent of corporate risk disclosure. 
Using a sample of top listed companies in Malaysia, our findings indicate that the CEOs’ tenure and ethnicity 
have significantly influence their decision making in regards corporate risk disclosure. Specifically, CEOs who 
are Bumiputera with shorter-tenured will influence the company to disclose more risk information to the public. 
However, it is important to note that the association between risk disclosure and manager-specific characteristics 
is still ambiguous. It could also be argued that unlike the effect of manager-specific factors on other types of 
corporate accounting choices and disclosure examined in prior studies, the manager-specific factors affecting the 
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level of risk disclosures are different.       
Upper echelons theory suggests that managers’ demographic characteristics are the appropriate starting point for 
exploring reasons for differences in individual managers’ pre-dispositions. From a practical perspective, 
evidence on the relations between CEOs’ reporting disclosure and their observable demographic characteristics 
can give some ideas to help investors evaluate the CEO’s information disclosure practices. The implication is 
that company boards concerned with creating responsiveness in management to providing more transparency on 
corporate risk should consider the importance of recruiting top managers with this ethnic background and 
directing them in the early stage of their appointment. A further finding is that the CAC’s background, including 
age, functional track, education, tenure or ethnicity, does not have a significant effect on the extent of corporate 
risk disclosure. This finding about the CAC has an implication for corporate governance policy-makers who set 
certain requirements/recommendations about the Chair and members of a company’s Audit Committee. It 
suggests that corporate governance regulation requiring the CAC to have a specific education, functional track or 
other background characteristics is unlikely to be a means of achieving improved corporate risk disclosure.  
This study mainly relies on the quantitative-based research approach in relation to determine the upper 
management characteristics. Perhaps future research could possibly use more in-depth information perspective 
such as interviews, questionnaire, survey and case study to probe into issues not clearly explainable in this study.  
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